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Abstract 
 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the conditions under which states become 
foreign aid donors. While the number of aid donors has dramatically increased in recent years, 
we know little about when states choose to become donors. By extending two existing theories 
of foreign aid allocations, I argue that there are three key factors driving states to give aid: the 
level of individual income, the overall level of governmental resources, and the size of winning 
coalition. I test these hypotheses using a newly collected data on states’ donorship. The 
statistical findings suggest that states are more likely to become foreign aid donors when the 
level of their citizens’ income and their governmental resources increase, providing support for 
my hypotheses. Surprisingly, the findings also suggest that states with smaller winning 
coalitions are more likely to become aid donors. It is contrary to the expectations that 
democratic regimes are primary donors of foreign aid. This thesis contributes to the literature 
on foreign aid by examining a new question about aid initiations, offering a new dataset on aid 
donorship, and providing statistical evidence that calls for new theoretical explanations. 
 
Index words: foreign aid, aid donorship, Official Development Assistance, emerging donors, 
  aid-for-charity model, aid-for-policy deals model. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
According to conventional wisdom, rich countries like the United States and European 
Union members should share and invest into the development of worse off nations. This is how 
we typically understand the drive behind foreign aid: Wealthy democracies are more likely to 
give aid than others. However, wealth may not be the most important driver of states' decisions 
to become active donors of foreign aid. For example, Singapore has a huge economy with the 
level of wealth exceeding those of most other countries. In 2015, Singapore ranked sixth 
globally with the per capita GDP of 53,224 USD according to the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). If wealth is an indicator of the state’s generosity and plays a key role in determining 
states’ decisions to give aid, Singapore should be among the leading foreign aid donors. 
However, Singapore is not very active in giving official development assistance to developing 
nations. On the contrary, while China is relatively poor country with per capita GDP of 8,280 
USD, it is a well-known donor of foreign aid. This leads to an interesting puzzle: What factors 
drive states' decisions to become active foreign aid donors?  
In this thesis, I aim to provide answers to this puzzle by questioning: when and under 
what conditions do states initiate aid giving? Drawing on a prominent model of foreign aid 
allocations (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007; 2009; Lumsdaine 1993; Noël and Thérien 
1995), I argue that other than some obvious determinants such as states' per capita GDP, factors 
including overall budget capabilities and transitions to more democratic regimes play crucial 
roles in determining whether states choose to become foreign aid donors. Such capabilities 
allow prospective donor countries to use foreign aid policy in their arsenal of foreign policy 
instruments.  
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I empirically test my hypotheses using regression analyses. As far as the outcome of 
interest is the donorship, I have collected data on official foreign aid donors. I designate donor 
countries as only those with an official aid agency.  The reason for doing so is as follows. First, 
aid agency is a key institutional body that implements aid policies and programs. Second, 
presence or the launch of aid agency imparts symbolic value meaning that the country is a donor 
or in transition from recipient to donor stance.  
Using this new data set, I investigate the determinants of states' donorship. As expected, 
the results show that resource-rich countries and those countries that have high individual 
income are more likely to become donors of foreign aid. I also demonstrate that the results 
regarding the governmental resources and individual income are robust. Surprisingly, my 
findings also suggest that states with small winning coalitions (i.e. autocratic regimes) are more 
likely to give foreign aid than those with large winning coalitions (i.e. democratic regimes).  
My thesis contributes to our understanding of foreign aid in several ways. First, this thesis 
proposes a novel question that has not been studied in the field of foreign aid. I demonstrate 
that investigating the question of when states choose to become aid donors provides one area 
in which we can examine the motivations behind aid giving. Second, the thesis extends the 
existing theories of foreign aid allocations to examine this new question. Third, and most 
importantly, this thesis introduces a novel measurement of aid donorship and provides a new 
data set to test my hypotheses about when states become aid donors. Finally, my empirical 
findings suggest that both humanitarianism and self-interests appear to motivate states to 
become aid donors, but also identify empirical patterns that require new explanations. Namely, 
the existing theories of foreign aid cannot account for my empirical finding that states with 
small winning coalitions seem more motivated to become aid donors. This suggests that future 
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research should investigate this relationship further and seek to provide theoretical answers to 
this surprising finding. Taken together, my thesis makes a significant contribution to the study 
of foreign aid. 
The thesis proceeds as follows. In the second chapter, I describe the broad literature 
related to the study of foreign aid. The third chapter presents the theoretical framework of the 
research question and derives testable hypotheses. In the fourth chapter, I construct the research 
design and test main hypotheses. Finally, the fifth chapter discussed the results and implication 
for future study. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
A new facet of foreign policy that has gained prominence since World War II is 
international aid.  In the last two decades, not only the amount of foreign aid but also the number 
of donor states have grown exponentially. As I will show below, much is written on how states 
allocate foreign aid among recipient countries. However, I will also show that we know little 
about when and why states start employing foreign aid as a foreign policy tool. To address this 
gap, I will extend existing theories on foreign aid allocations and seek to identify the conditions 
under which states choose to provide aid more generally. 
The literature on foreign aid addresses two important research topics: 1) the effectiveness 
of foreign aid and 2) the allocation of foreign aid among recipients. To start with, I will discuss 
literature on the first research topic, and then proceed to the literature on aid allocations. The 
latter is more relevant to and important for the thesis because my theoretical arguments are built 
on the insights from this literature.   
 
2.1. Aid effectiveness 
 
Foreign aid scholars have long debated whether foreign aid is effective in promoting 
economic growth in recipient countries (Boone 1990). To this date, there is still no consensus 
on the aid and growth nexus. Instead of arguing whether aid is effective or not, the recent 
literature argues that aid can be effective under certain conditions. As such, the recent literature 
is primarily interested in identifying the conditions under which the impact of aid disbursements 
is effective in promoting economic growth and alleviating poverty in recipient countries. 
Studies by Burnside and Dollar (2000), Dollar and Levin (2004), and Radelet (2004) are 
good examples of the argument that aid might be effectiveness under conditions. They make a 
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strong link between aid effectiveness and good policies in recipient countries and argue that aid 
is likely to expedite growth within the good governance and policies environment. Consistent 
with this argument, other studies also find countries with good human rights records (Jenkins 
and Scanlan 2001), and high level of democratization (Kosack 2003) tend to use aid more 
effectively. Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani (2004) also argue that different types of aid have 
different effects on economic growth while on aggregate level it might not show clear growth-
promoting effects.1  
These examples illustrate that the characteristics of recipient countries are key factors in 
determining aid effectiveness. In the same vein, Buffardi (2011) incorporates donor-side 
variables into empirical analysis of aid effectiveness. The author finds that insufficient level of 
aid transfers, high volatility of aid flows, predominantly self-serving nature of aid in form of 
tied aid, deficiency of policy coherence within donor countries and across them, accountability 
only to constituents of donor countries rather than to project beneficiaries make aid ineffective. 
The literature also reveals that aid selectivity based on policy rewarding and poverty 
reduction goals are important in determining the effectiveness of aid. Roodman (2003) develops 
the aid selectivity index, which is essentially the combination of institutional and poverty 
selectivity. Institutional selectivity aims at targeting countries with sound institutional 
environment while poverty selectivity guides donors to favor the poorest countries since it aims 
at enhancing development there (Dollar and Levine 2005; McGillivray 2003).   
Altogether, the literature on the aid effectiveness has successfully identified some 
conditions under which foreign aid is effective. These findings are supposed to inform 
policymakers to improve the quality of foreign aid and thus contribute to the economic 
                                                             
1 They find that budget support and aid targeting infrastructure, agriculture and industry are highly effective in 
comparison to other types of aid because they are oriented at enhancing growth in short period of time. 
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development and poverty alleviation in recipient countries. However, one implicit assumption 
here is that donors allocate foreign aid to address poverty. In fact, some opponents of foreign 
aid like Easterly (2003) are skeptical about donors’ motivations because despite decades of 
failure of aid in Africa and South Asia, there is no observable improvement in growth records. 
Below, I will discuss the literature on foreign aid allocations and motivations behind aid giving.   
 
2.2. Aid allocations and motivations behind aid giving 
 
One more fundamental research topics is determinants of foreign aid. This group of 
literature attempts to explain reasons behind those aid transfers by analyzing the distribution of 
foreign aid among recipients.  
Aid scholars have identified two reasons for why donors provide foreign aid. Thus, they 
argue that aid allocations can be explained by (1) strategic and political considerations (Alesina 
and Dollar 2000; Balla and Reinhardt 2008; Bearce and Tirone 2010; Meernik, Krueger, and 
Poe 1998; McKinlay and Little 1977; Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 
1998); (2) moral considerations (Lumsdaine 1993; Lancaster 2007); and (3) development 
motives (Azam and Laffont 2003; Bermeo 2007; Dunning 2004; Neumayer 2003). Below, I 
will describe them in order. 
2.2.1. Humanitarian motivations  
 
Humanitarian concerns are considered one of the key drivers of short-term assistance in 
response to emergencies and long-term development assistance targeting poverty reduction and 
boosting economic growth in developing countries. One of the most important studies that 
frames foreign aid as a humanitarian foreign policy instrument is a study by Lumsdaine (1993). 
According to Lumsdaine (1993), states with democratic traditions and strong welfare 
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redistribution institutions are more likely to be concerned with poverty abroad and as a result 
more willing to provide foreign aid. This argument was echoed by Noël and Thérien (1995), 
who also argue that welfare state on the domestic level is replicated at the international level. 
Their argument is that principles institutionalized in social democratic welfare state influence 
publics to support foreign aid policy. Hence, public support for foreign aid is crucial in 
conditioning government’s distributive behavior abroad. These theoretical arguments give a 
ground to content that individual attitudes to government efficiency and income positively 
correlates with foreign aid support (Chong and Gradstein 2008).  
While the argument that humanitarian concerns and sympathy are important drivers of 
aid giving, there is a vast literature suggesting that foreign aid is all about national interests and 
is a measure to pursue foreign policy goals. According to Griffin and Enos, “… there are other 
reasons for which foreign aid is given, and by which donor countries judge its effectiveness. 
Individuals may be humane and disinterested, but nations are not. When people collect together 
to promote their own interests, they lose their sympathy for others” (1970, 314). Therefore, it 
is pertinent to consider selfish intents for aid giving. 
2.2.2. Selfish motivations 
 
It is widely recognized that political and economic interests drive the allocations of 
foreign aid. The most prominent theoretical work that provides explicit causal mechanisms of 
aid giving include that of Palmer, Wohlander and Morgan (2002) on the “two-good model” of 
foreign aid and Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2007, 2009) on the “aid-for-policy deals model”. 
Palmer, Wohlander and Morgan (2002) were the first to apply a general theory of foreign 
policy to study foreign aid allocations. They attempt to explain aid donations in the context of 
foreign policy portfolio where foreign aid policy is one of the tools to seek change or maintain 
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status quo in the international system. Their findings suggest that powerful states (i.e. countries 
with considerable national capabilities) are more likely to give foreign aid rather than weaker 
states because their affluent financial capabilities allow them to “buy” influence from less 
capable states.   
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007; 2009) provide different theoretical explanations to 
aid giving.  They theorize that “aid-for-policy-deals” are determined first and foremost by 
domestic politics and considerations, rather than some vague notions of states’ “national 
interests”. Aid policy initiation is thus dependent on key parameters like resources, size of 
winning coalition and issue salience. Foreign aid, when viewed as an interaction, is clearly a 
foreign policy instrument that seeks policy concessions. Therefore, foreign aid opens new 
opportunities and serves as an advantage for donors while recipients seek “easy money” to 
sustain their political survival.  
As the previous paragraphs indicate, scholars argue that foreign aid is a useful instrument 
of statecraft and helps leaders achieve foreign and domestic policy goals. Aside from Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith (2007; 2009) and Palmer et al. (2002), much empirical evidence supports 
these arguments. For example, some find that aid is given in search for reputation (Horiuchi 
and Goldsmith 2012), preferential trade agreements (Baccini and Urpelainen 2012), gaining 
access to natural resources (Dreher et al. 2015), production of transnational public goods 
(Ohtsuki 2015), alignment with UN voting (Kuziemko and Werker 2006). The decision to 
become a donor, therefore, may be a deeply political one.  
While the extant literature suggests that foreign aid is indeed a valuable foreign policy 
instrument, prior research has not explicitly addressed the question of when states give aid. I 
argue that it is important to understand when states give aid in the light of the emergence of 
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new donors. Below, I will discuss the new literature on the emerging donors and point out that 
this literature also fails to explain why these new donors started giving aid.  
 
2.3. “New” donors of foreign aid 
 
New donors widely known as emerging or non-DAC donors refer to countries with re-
emerging aid programs (Poland, Slovenia, Mexico, Turkey, etc.), providers of South-South 
Cooperation (BRICS), Arab donors, and very recent providers of aid (Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan).2  
 There is an increasing interest in analyzing aid allocation patterns of those non-traditional 
donors. Woods (2008), Dreher et al. (2011), Petrikova (2016) suggest that so-called emerging 
donors do not differ from the traditional donors like the United States and Japan. They find that 
these new donors also pay less attention to the “need” of developing countries. Case studies of 
China (Dreher and Fuchs 2011), Arab donors (Neumayer 2003; 2004), and India (Fuchs and 
Vadlamannati 2013) suggest that these emerging donors allocate more aid to their neighboring 
countries, to countries that share their religious identities, and to resource-rich recipients (e.g. 
Chinese aid to Africa). In most cases, the literature on emerging donors is limited in a sense 
that they only study the determinants of the aid allocation patterns of the emerging donors. 
Therefore, my contribution is to identify why they became donors in the first place.  
Below, I will draw on the existing theories of foreign aid and explore factors that explain 
states’ decisions to start giving aid and thus the emergence of new donors.   
                                                             
2 Donors that are not members of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) within Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
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Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework 
 
The objective of this thesis is to identify the conditions under which states become a 
donor. To do so, I draw on two different perspectives of aid giving. The first one is what I call 
“aid-for-charity” model in which humanitarian considerations influence states’ aid giving. The 
second is the “aid-for-policy deals” model in which states’ self-interests influence states’ use 
of foreign aid.  
The theory section starts by briefly discussing Lumsdaine (1993), Noël and Thérien 
(1995), Bueno de Mesquita and Smith’s (2007; 2009) insights into motivations of aid giving. It 
then turns to assessing how these insights help identify key factors that precondition states’ 
donorship.   
 
3.1. Aid-for-charity model 
 
Historically, the strong support for foreign aid has been linked to donors’ humanitarian 
motivations. Moreover, foreign aid by its own definition – making goods available to 
developing countries on the concessional basis - is concerned with something beyond material 
interests of the state. Therefore, I first consider humanitarian concerns as a main motivation for 
donors’ aid giving. I rely on the established theory by Lumsdaine (1993), Noël and Thérien 
(1995). 
Lumsdaine (1993) argues that the “state” identity plays a key role in understanding 
foreign aid giving. “State” identity is a composition of individuals’ identity and their support 
for poverty alleviation. It implies that maturity of civil society’s giving values plays a key role 
in forming foreign assistance. Additionally, in their recent paper, Lumsdaine and Schopf (2007) 
have expanded the humanitarian framework to explain the aid allocation patterns by the 
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emerging donors, specifically on the case of South Korea. They argue that the values of civil 
society in 1990s were decisive in employing aid for Korean government’s political purposes 
like entering into the United Nations and enhancing economic relations with developing 
countries. Then, only starting from 1999s Lumsdaine and Schopf (2007) state that Korean aid 
is the result of humanitarian motivations due to increased citizens’ participation and 
volunteering, extended activities of NGOs. 
Noël and Thérien (1995) improve this humanitarian theory by introducing the role of 
welfare state. They argue that developed mechanisms of economic and welfare redistribution 
within countries positively influence their distributional behavior abroad. It follows that states 
with effective social spending policies are more likely to give foreign aid to other nations for 
the purpose of poverty alleviation. They show that the level of expenditures, government’s 
partisan orientation, and institutional attributes of the state are indicative of aid giving. They 
further argue that Sweden and Netherland’s active foreign aid efforts can be mainly explained 
by their considerably high social spending as a percentage of their gross national products.  
Altogether, the humanitarian perspective by Lumsdaine (1993), Noël and Thérien (1995) 
argues that states’ concerns for the poor influence states’ aid giving behavior. I argue that public 
opinion is a decisive factor that determines states’ concerns for the poor. Furthermore, I argue 
that public support and the sense of obligation to help the poor should positively correlate with 
their increased individual income. Then, we should expect that the higher the income level, the 
more support citizens give to aid giving and thus the more likely their government is to become 
an aid donor. This leads to the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: As individual level income increases, the state is more likely to become an 
aid donor. 
12 
 
 
 
Before moving further, it is pertinent to mention rationale behind limiting 
operationalization of public support to only individual GDP and not adding other components. 
While one of the obvious measures of public support seems to be public opinion, it turns out 
problematic. The reason is that it is harder to measure public opinion in large-N study with 
different countries. Data is not consistently available. The literature also suggests left-wing 
parties (Tingley 2010), domestic social spending (Noël and Thérien 1995), bureaucracy (Arel-
Bundock, Atkinson and Potter 2015; Lancaster 2008), ideology alike individual-level and 
society-level variables affect citizens to choose aid as an option they wish their leaders to 
pursue. However, excluding them is also connected to bad data issues. 
If we assume that states give foreign aid only because of their humanitarian concerns, 
then we would expect that this should also explain aid-giving behavior by emerging donors 
such as China and Brazil. However, many emerging donors give aid but at the same time 
continue receiving aid from traditional donors. On the surface, this observation is inconsistent 
with the argument based on the “aid-for-charity” model. According to the rationale of the “aid-
for-charity” model, emerging donors should be giving aid out of moral obligations to contribute 
to poverty alleviation. However, what is the essence of giving aid if you need it yourself? 
I show here that this observation is not that consistent with the “aid-for-charity” model. 
In contrast to the traditional Western donors, the emerging donors seek to help other poorer 
states by giving aid in specific sectors in which they have expertise. Moreover, I argue that their 
shared “developing country” identity helps those emerging donors provide help more 
effectively. To see whether this logic works or not, I will consider aid giving by Brazil and 
China. I select these cases because China and Brazil implement the most comprehensive aid 
programs in comparison to other emerging donors. This allows my in-depth investigations of 
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their aid activities. Below, I assume that states’ sector preferences in aid allocations reflect their 
developmental expertise. If there is a case of inconsistency between sector and expertise, then 
I expect that donor states pursue more than only humanitarian objectives. On the contrary, if 
emerging donors provide aid into sectors where they achieved developmental success and 
expertise, moreover, traditional donors recognized it; I infer that it justifies their 
humanitarianism.  
According to Wolford and Nehring (2015), about 50% of Brazilian aid between 2003 and 
2010 focus on agricultural, health, and education sectors. In the subsequent paragraphs, I will 
look into the actual aid data and attempt to check whether Brazilian expertise reflects sector 
priorities in aid allocation.   
According to AidData (Tierney et al. 2011), three sectors account for about 50% of 
development aid provided by Brazil during 1998-2009, which is consistent with Wolford and 
Nehring (2015). First, the agriculture sector represents 13 percent of Brazilian aid programs. 
This is consistent with Brazil’s expertise because Brazil in the last four decades has become the 
seventh agricultural giant. Given the similarities in soil and climate between Brazil and Africa, 
for instance, implies that aid technologies can easily be adapted in recipient countries.  
Moreover, the health and education sectors account for 43% per cent of development 
programs by Brazil during 1998 and 2009. Brazil’s initiatives in HIV/AIDS treatment are a 
reflection of its homegrown success of development because Brazil is the first developing 
country that achieved large-scale production and distribution of antiretroviral drugs for HIV 
patients within its own country (Greco and Simao 2007). The third-largest share of aid is in 
education sector. Altogether, it demonstrates that Brazil has reached a certain level of 
excellence in those sectors, thus prioritizes those areas in aid programs. Precisely, Brazilian aid 
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mirrored on prioritizing literacy programs, combating urban violence and youth gangs, HIV-
AIDS awareness and prevention initiatives, agricultural technologies. This discussion shows 
that Brazil indeed shares its expertise with other developing countries by giving aid in particular 
sectors. This suggests that Brazil case is consistent with the aid-for-charity model. 
Unlike the Brazilian case, Chinese aid appears to reflect considerations beyond its moral 
concerns. That is, Chinese aid does not appear to reflect its expertise. According to the White 
Paper on China’s foreign aid, its aid sector preferences fall on the economic infrastructure (44.8 
%), social and public infrastructure (27.6 %), goods and materials (15%).3 In the same vein, 
AidData reports that infrastructure and public works projects and natural resource development 
activities constitute the largest share of Chinese aid during 2000 and 2013.4 Contrary to the 
Brazilian case, sectors that have been successful in China’s own developmental process such 
as agriculture, renewable energy, poverty reduction find less reflection. China, for example, 
allocated only 2% of total aid into agriculture during 2010-2012 period. It follows that China is 
mostly engaged in infrastructure and natural resources sectors (Kjøllesdal and Welle-Strand 
2010; Lum, Fischer, Gomez-Granger, and Leland 2009).  
In sum, the behavior of emerging donors appears to challenge the logic of the aid-for-
charity model because they give and receive aid simultaneously. However, once we look more 
closely at the content of aid given by emerging donors, we see evidence that aid giving by 
emerging donors are driven at least in part by humanitarian concerns. I demonstrated this with 
the case of Brazil. However, my discussion also shows that some emerging donors like China 
seems to show more than its humanitarian concerns. This leads to the next section in which we 
consider other motivations of aid giving. 
                                                             
3 White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid issued by the information Office of the State Council on July 10, 2014. 
4 Chinese Official Finance to Africa. AidData dataset. Available at: http://aiddata.org/donor-datasets 
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3.2. Aid-for-policy deals model  
 
As demonstrated in the literature review, foreign aid is motivated not only by donors' 
humanitarian concerns but also their strategic interests (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009; Bearce and Tirone 2014; Kuziemko and Werker 2006). Thus, 
in this subsection, I will make arguments about aid initiation based on the assumption that states 
are selfish. 
My main approach to foreign aid is built on the selectorate theory.5 The theory assumes 
that states employ self-serving policies including foreign aid. By giving aid, donors engage in 
so-called aid-for-policy deals in which both donor and recipient leaders make rational decisions 
on resource allocations to move forward interests of political elites and protect their political 
survival. 
3.2.1. Selectorate theory 
 
First, I discuss the essence of the selectorate theory. This theory assumes that political 
leaders seek to maximize the chance of their survival in the office. All polities comprise of two 
institutions: selectorate and winning coalition. The selectorate is the set of people who have a 
say in choosing a potential leader. One distinctive attribute of the selectorate is that it is a pool 
of citizens from which a leader forms his/her winning coalition. The incumbent leader needs to 
maintain the support of those who are in her winning coalition for the purposes of her political 
survival. 
The key decision for the incumbent leader is to allocate her resources between two types 
of goods: public and private goods. Public and private goods represent policy provisions with 
                                                             
5 I use selectorate theory developed by Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2005). 
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one difference. While public goods policies provide benefits to everyone in the polity (including 
winning coalition members as well as selectorate), private goods policies benefit only the 
winning coalition members. The allocation of private and public goods is obviously constrained 
by the level of resources available to the incumbent leader. Thus, the leader has an incentive to 
maximize these resources because it is the key to secure support from her winning coalition. 
The main sources of the leader’s resources include taxation, external economic relations (trade, 
FDI, foreign aid, etc.) and revenues from natural resources, if there is any.  
The incumbent leader’s decision on resource allocation; (i.e., government budget); 
involves two strategic calculations. First, she must consider how much to spend on the winning 
coalition in order to secure loyalty and support. Second, she must consider how much should 
go to public and private goods. The cost of private goods is determined by the size of her 
winning coalition. The larger the winning coalition, the more spending it requires because there 
are simply more members to serve.  
How much the incumbent leader spends on private versus public goods depends on the 
size of her winning coalition. When a polity has a small winning coalition, then a relatively 
small number of key backers, whose support is required, can be satisfied by private goods. 
When polity has a large winning coalition, then provision of private goods has trade-offs such 
as increasing the cost of buying support. It is a considerable burden to the government resources 
because the leader is constrained by them. Thus, as the size of winning coalition increases, the 
focus from private goods shifts to the allocation of public goods.  
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3.2.2. Aid-for-policy deals 
 
Following the selectorate theory discussed above, I assume that state leaders choose 
policies to maximize the chance of their survival. I view foreign aid is one of policies that state 
leaders can use to satisfy their winning coalitions and thus stay in office. That is, one state 
leader can bribe another with aid money in order to obtain policy concessions that are in interest 
of her winning coalition. By policy concessions, I mean an adoption of policy that fits the 
objectives of a donor country, such as the provision of preferential trade with the donor, support 
in international organizations, and support in collective actions in the international politics.  
Buying policy concessions from recipients comes at a price. Donor leaders must give up 
some portions of their resources that might otherwise have been used to fund domestic 
provisions for their winning coalition. The theory treats that price as a foreign aid, which 
depends on the size of the recipient’s winning coalition, governmental resources, and the extent 
to which policy concessions are salient to the recipient. More concretely, policy concessions 
from relatively wealthy and democratic states would cost more for the donor than those from 
autocratic countries with poor economic performance. The logic behind these results is simple. 
The leaders of wealthier and large-winning coalition states require much more money to satisfy 
their coalitions.  
For example, the US government committed $150 million in aid to Kyrgyzstan during the 
campaign in Afghanistan in order to gain access to its air base. On the other hand, in its 
campaign to Iraq, the US government offered $6 billion to the government of Turkey in order 
to base US troops there (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009, 322). In both cases, the US sought 
strategic interests, but due to different characteristics of the recipient governments, the aid 
volumes varied. These clearly show that the more democratic and wealthier the recipient 
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country, the more aid it requires to alter its behavior. This also suggests that the wealthier the 
state, the more expensive concession it can extract from other states. Thus, I argue that donor 
countries must have considerable financial capabilities to engage into aid-for-policy deals with 
other countries to pursue their interests.  
Thus, countries with considerable governmental resources can afford buying policy 
concessions and engage in aid-for-policy deals. In contrast, resource-poor countries cannot 
afford acquisition of policy concessions by making side payments. By following this logic, I 
derive the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2:  As its pool of resources increase, the state is more likely to become an  
aid donor. 
The rationale behind this hypothesis is that states first and foremost require sufficient 
resources that exceeds of recipient countries in order to be able to offer an aid deal. Hence, I 
theorize that budgetary capabilities of prospective donors are one of the factors that influence 
their donorship.  
It is worthwhile to emphasize that Hypothesis 2 is distinct from Hypothesis 1 and that 
they follow different logics. Hypothesis 2 relates aid donorship to the state's overall resources, 
(as measured by gross domestic product or GDP), whereas Hypothesis 1 concerns the citizens' 
income levels (as measured by GDP per capita). The difference is also connected to the 
theoretical predictions they imply. To recall, Hypothesis 1 argues that helping/giving values 
determined my individual income, and consequently conditions donorship. Hypothesis 2 states 
that the size of economy matters for the same purposes, but helps to achieve policy concessions 
in exchange. 
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In addition, I expect that the size of winning coalition to have a positive impact on 
donorship. The key point here is that the size of winning coalition shapes the focus of policy 
toward provision of public or private goods. In small coalition states, which are also more likely 
to be nondemocratic, leaders reward members of the coalition by providing private goods (e.g. 
trade contracts). However, as the size of winning coalition increases rewarding its members 
comes at a high price, so that the leader shifts to providing more public goods. Because policy 
concessions from recipient states are normally public goods in nature (e.g. votes in international 
organizations), donation of foreign aid can be considered public goods policy. Therefore, I 
expect the following relationship:  
Hypothesis 3:  A state is more likely to become a donor as the size of its winning coalition 
increases.  
In other words, more democratic states are more likely to donate foreign aid than less 
democratic states. In the theory section, I extended the logic of the “aid-for-charity” and “aid-
for-policy deals” models and identified factors that precondition states’ aid giving. In doing so, 
I propose that the level of individual income (Hypothesis 1), the level of governmental 
resources (Hypothesis 2), and the size of winning coalition (Hypothesis 3) are key determinants 
of states’ donorship.   
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Chapter 4 Research Design 
 
Building on the existing models of humanitarian and selfish donors, I expect that the 
governmental resources, individual income, the size of winning coalition positively and 
independently affect the decisions to initiate aid giving. This chapter discusses all aspects of 
my empirical tests of these hypotheses – i.e. how theoretical concepts are operationalized and 
measured, the data sources, and the method used to estimate effects. 
 
4.1. Sample and unit of analysis 
 
My hypotheses concern what factors drive states to become donors or non-donors. Thus, 
it is appropriate to use a county year as a unit of analysis. I include all potential donors—i.e. all 
states. The temporal domain I selected is from 1960 to 2014. It covers the post-World War II 
era when the majority of traditional donors began to employ foreign aid  
In order to construct a sample of countries, I rely on the definition of states by Correlates 
of War Project (Small and Singer 1982).6 This data contains a list of 243 countries in the 
international system that have been the members of the League of Nations/United Nations, have 
a population no less than 500,000 people, and received recognition at least from two major 
powers. After excluding those countries, which were not members of the international system 
in 1960, the sample is reduced to 202 states. The Correlates of War Project It is a prominent 
resource which most of scholars in international study refer in order to identify sovereign states 
(Bremer 1992; Gibler and Sarkees 2004).  
Thus, my sample includes 202 states and the total of 10,634 observations for the period 
1960-2014.  
                                                             
6 The Correlates of War Project  http://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/state-system-membership  
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4.2. Operationalization of variables 
 
This section discusses the operationalization and measurements of all variables and 
describe the data sources for each. The dependent variable, independent variables, and control 
variables are defined and discussed in turn. 
4.2.1. Dependent variable: donorship 
 
The dependent variable determines whether a state is a donor of foreign aid or not. It 
represents donor status of all observations, i.e. countries in all years, included in the sample. 
Thus, I consider and refer to the donorship as the outcome variable.  It is a dichotomous 
variable, which we coded as one when it managed to have an aid agency, and zero otherwise. 
I use the presence of aid agencies as a measure of aid initiations for two reasons. First, 
theoretically, aid agencies represent institutions that implement mediations between interests 
and preferences of donor and recipient countries. As it was demonstrated in the literature review 
chapter, aid determinants, i.e. humanitarian and selfish motivations, are fundamental 
motivations for giving aid. Aid agencies are a key body in promoting state’s policy and 
constituents’ support concerning aid giving. Once a state established aid agencies, they develop 
and go through institutional changes rather than suspending their activity.  
Second, the presence of aid agencies better capture systematic aid giving rather than some 
ad hoc aid giving. For example, Kazakhstan has recently given aid to neighboring recipients; 
however, those were temporary funds given for specific purposes.7 Thus, to capture a systematic 
                                                             
7 KAZINFORM. 2014. “Kazakhstan leads in terms of assistance in in Central Asia and Afghanistan” Available 
at: http://www.government.kz/en/novosti/21166-kazakhstan-leads-in-terms-of-assistance-in-central-asia-and-
afghanistan.html  
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aid giving rather than an ad hoc aid giving, I opt for using aid agencies as a measure of aid 
giving in my thesis.  
Alternatively, another measure of aid donorship could be constructed with actual 
commitments or disbursements of Official Development Assistance (ODA).8 While this is more 
in line with the traditional aid literature, I argue that there are several issues for the purpose of 
this thesis. The first issue has to do with the issue of country coverage. The classic aid data 
source, i.e. Creditor Reporting System (CRS), covers 34 traditional donors only, while the 
analysis requires the sample of all donor countries including the emerging donors.9 The new 
AidData data is able to fill this gap by providing extensive information about non-traditional 
donors.10 Nevertheless, it also lacks key donors like China and is constructed in a way that 
presents disaggregated data of project records. For these reasons, I opted for collecting my own 
data on states’ aid donorship. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss how the data are 
collected.  
To start with, I refer to Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development to 
define aid agencies (OECD, 2009). Institutional models of aid agencies vary from country to 
country, and thus incorporating them under a common concept is important for the clarity of 
data. There are four institutional models of aid agencies within the framework of OECD. The 
first one is development cooperation, which is integrated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
                                                             
8 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines foreign aid as an Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
if “transaction (1) is administered with the promotion of economic development and welfare of developing 
countries as its main objective, (2) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per 
cent” (OECD DAC Factsheet “Is it ODA?”. November 2008. Available at 
https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/34086975.pdf ). However, DAC statistics do not include loans repayable within 
one year, grants and loans for military purposes, and transfer payments to private individuals.  
9 OECD DAC maintains Creditor Reporting System (CRS). It is a competent source of ODA and other official 
flows from DAC members.  The data available at: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1   
10 AidData is a country-level research data consisting of aid statistics for more than 90 bilateral and multilateral 
donors. The data available at: http://aiddata.org/country-level-research-datasets  
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thus responsibility for policy and implementation is shared, e.g. Danish International 
Development Agency (DANIDA). Second, development cooperation is completely managed 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, e.g. Irish Aid. Third, the ministry is responsible for the 
strategic and political dimension and special agency takes responsibility to implement 
operational aspects, e.g. Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). 
Forth, separate agency is responsible for both policy and implementation of international 
development assistance, e.g. USAID. Additionally, it is worth adding public institutions 
governed by boards of directors such as in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.   
As it turns out, the establishment of those aid agencies is not static over time. To 
demonstrate the extent to which different institutional models of aid agencies were considered 
in structuring my data, I present the case of the British aid agency. UK’s aid agency has its 
origins in the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) that was created in 1970. It was 
under the control of Foreign Office. Then it has been separated from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in 1997. For the purposes of the thesis, I consider Britain to be a donor of foreign aid 
starting from 1970. This procedure was applied to the entire sample. Of course, the change in 
the institutional design of agencies indicates changes in strategic orientation and policy 
priorities, political salience of development assistance. However, the sole presence of an aid 
agency is enough to conclude that states take seriously interaction with developing recipient 
countries and commit to aid giving. Another coding issue is related to the presence of multiple 
aid institutions. As in case of Germany, there are a number of governmental and non-
governmental aid institutions (e.g. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(GIZ), GmbH German Corporation for International Cooperation, and German Development 
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Bank (KfW) for financial cooperation) To overcome this problem, I code the initial aid 
institutions that is consistent with the OECD institutional models.  
In the data collection, I mainly searched for and used information from official websites 
of Ministries of Foreign Affairs and aid agencies. However, I was not able to find relevant 
information in all donors. For example, there is no official information on the Iraqi aid agency 
while a study by Van den Boogaerde (1991) shows that during the period of 1974-1982 Iraq 
had an aid agency. Therefore, I also used scholarly articles and books to find relevant 
information about whether states had aid agencies. Specifically, a study by Neumayer (2005) 
was useful in providing the nuances of Arab aid agencies’ structure and functions. Moreover, I 
used extended reports by OECD to find information about aid agency of Portugal (OECD 2006) 
and Colombia (OECD 2013). More information about donors and their implementing aid 
agencies can be found in in the Appendices section.11 
Through my extensive data collection efforts, I found that 52 states became donors and 
150 remain non-donors. Once establishing aid agencies, almost all states remain as aid donors. 
However, interestingly, I found that Iraq had an aid agency, i.e. the Iraqi Fund for External 
Development, in 1974 but decided not to become donor any more in 1982. 
4.2.2. Independent variables 
 
The main independent variables are the size of winning coalition, level of government 
resources, and per capita income. These variables allow me to test the hypotheses presented in 
the theory chapter. In the subsequent paragraphs, I will present measurements used for 
explanatory variables and try to link theoretical concepts and empirical representations of them. 
 
                                                             
11 Detailed information on aid agencies of separate countries is presented in the Appendix A. 
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Winning coalition (W)  
According to Bueno de Mesquita et al., a winning coalition is a group that “controls the 
essential features that constitute political power in the system” (2005, 10).  
The variable for winning coalition sizes (W) is operationalized in accordance with the 
one proposed by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005).12 It is a composite measure of several 
executive recruitment variables drawn from the Polity IV Project (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 
2010) and a regime type variable from the Democracy Time-Series Data (Norris 2009). More 
specifically, the component variables for the executive recruitment are the competitiveness of 
executive recruitment (XRCOMP), openness of executive recruitment (XROPEN), and the 
competitiveness of participation (PARCOMP). The winning coalition variable takes the 
maximum value of 1 and minimum value of 0. In my sample, the mean of this variable in the 
sample is 0.56 with a standard deviation SD = 0 .27. 
 
Government resources (lnGDP) 
Government resources variable represents the level of resources available to the leader of 
a prospective donor government. In other words, it is the budgetary capability of the potential 
donor state. The state’s resources are operationalized with the inflation-adjusted Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) indicator in billion dollars. Following the existing studies, I take the 
natural logarithm of GDP (lnGDP). The mean of the variable is 23.31 while the standard 
deviation is SD = 2.40. I drew data on countries’ real GDP from the World Development 
Indicators (World Bank, 2014). 
 
                                                             
12 See Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005) for detailed description of how this variable is constructed. 
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Individual income (lnGDPprc)  
The income variable represents the level of citizens’ income in a potential donor country. 
I use per capita GDP of states to capture the level of citizens’ income. As in the case of 
government resources, I also take the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (lnGDPprc). In my 
sample, the mean of the income variable is 7.91 and the standard deviation is 1.601. The data 
are taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2014). 
 
4.2.3. Control variables  
 
Trade (lnexportGDP)  
I include another variable as a control variable in my empirical models. Scholars have 
argued that aid promotes the export and import capacity of a recipient country (Cali and Te 
Velde 2011; Helble, Mann, and Wilson 2012). It follows that trade interests motivate donor 
countries to provide foreign assistance. By liberating trade in recipient countries, donor 
governments can ensure sustained and continuous trade relations with them. Therefore, I 
control for the effect of self-interest to gain trade benefits by including exports of goods and 
services as a share of its GDP. The mean of the trade variable is 3.47 and its standard deviation 
is 0.70. The data on export (% of GDP) are drawn from the World Bank Indicators (World Bank 
2014). The set of control variables constrained to only trade because the literature lacks 
alternative determinants of donorship. 
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4.3. Statistical model 
 
To test my hypotheses, I employ logit models. Logit models are appropriate given that 
my dependent variable, i.e. donorship, is a dichotomous variable. Therefore, the full statistical 
model is as follows: 
𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖 ~ ∏ (
exp(𝛽0𝑊𝑖+𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖+𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖+𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐺𝐷𝑃)
1+exp(𝛽0𝑊𝑖+𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖+𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖+𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐺𝐷𝑃)
)𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 ×
 (
exp(𝛽0𝑊𝑖+𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖+𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖+𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐺𝐷𝑃)
1+exp(𝛽0𝑊𝑖+𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖+𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖+𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐺𝐷𝑃)
)1−𝑦𝑖                                                              (1) 
According to the “aid-for-charity” model, I expect a positive relationship between the 
level of individual income and the probability of donorship (𝛽2 > 0). The “aid-for-policy deals” 
model suggests that parameters estimates on the winning coalition size and governmental 
resources should be positive (𝛽0 > 0 and 𝛽3 > 0).   
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Chapter 5 Empirical Analysis of States’ Donorship 
 
5.1. Empirical results 
 
The results from my analyses of states’ decisions to become aid donors are summarized 
in Table 1. Model 1 includes only the winning coalition variable (W) while Model 2 the 
governmental resources variable (lnGDP) and Model 3 the individual income variable 
(lnGDPpr).  In Models 4 and 5, I include different combinations of those variables. Finally, 
Model 6 presents the full specification.   
 
Table 1: Analysis of Donorship 
       
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Winning coalition  4.475***   1.549*** 1.055*** -0.550*** 
 (0.153)   (0.164) (0.165) (0.185) 
Goverment resources  0.942***  0.853***  0.751*** 
  (0.0265)  (0.0272)  (0.0302) 
Individual income   1.504***  1.416*** 1.382*** 
   (0.0429)  (0.0443) (0.0543) 
Constant 5.033*** -25.08*** -15.28*** -23.90*** -15.23*** -32.57*** 
 (0.120) (0.678) (0.414) (0.673) (0.414) (0.973) 
       
Observations 10,484 7,929 7,925 7,929 7,925 7,923 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
First, consider Model 1. The estimated coefficient on the winning coalition variable is 
positive as predicted and statistically significant. This suggests that the probability that a state 
becomes an aid donor increases with the size of its winning coalition. This finding is consistent 
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with the theoretical argument made by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007; 2009) that 
democratic countries are more likely to employ foreign aid as a foreign policy tool and supports 
H3.  
Next, consider Models 2 and 3. The results show that the levels of governmental resources 
(lnGDP) and individual income (lnGDPprc) are positively related to the donorship variable and 
the relationship is statistically significant. These findings suggest that as the financial 
capabilities of the state and citizens’ welfare increase, the government is more likely to start 
donating foreign aid. These findings provide support for H1 and H2. 
The results are similar when we include some of the key independent variables in the 
same models. Model 4 represents the “aid-for-policy deals” model in that it includes both the 
winning coalition and governmental resources variables. The results indicate that both of them 
are statistically significant and positively correlated with states’ decisions to become aid donors. 
On the other hand, Model 5 includes both the winning coalition and individual income 
variables. The findings from Model 5 support the same conclusions from the previous models.  
Finally, consider Model 6 that includes all three key independent variables. The results 
reveal two key findings. First, the effects of the governmental resources and individual income 
variables remain positive and statistically significant. This demonstrates that when states and 
their citizens are wealthy, they are more likely to be donors of foreign aid. Importantly, it 
suggests that strategic and development-minded intentions both drive aid giving. These findings 
are consistent with recent findings from a study by Heinrich (2013) that broad news coverage 
of recipient countries and donor’s incentives to buy policy concessions simultaneously shape 
aid giving. Second, unlike the previous models, the full model (Model 6) provides a novel 
finding that states with small winning coalitions are more likely to be donors. After controlling 
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for both the income and overall resources levels of states, the effect of the winning coalitions 
variable turned out to be opposite of what was expected. Hence, what makes countries with 
small ruling coalitions to take on the donor role? A few specific cases help illustrate significance 
of this statistical finding. Georgia, for instance, is relatively democratic in comparison to Egypt. 
However, while Georgia is not active in foreign aid giving, Egypt became a donor of foreign 
aid by establishing an aid agency in 2014. This finding is novel and surprising in that neither 
“aid-for-charity” nor “aid-for-policy deal” models can explain this.  
 
5.2. Robustness checks 
 
To see whether the aforementioned results are robust to changes in measurements and 
model specifications, I re-estimated Model 6 with the following changes. First, I added the trade 
variable, i.e. control variable (Model 7). The results are summarized in Table 2. Second, I 
constructed an alternative measure of the winning coalition using polity2 variable (Model 8). I 
do so because the winning coalition size can be considered as a measurement of regime types. 
Polity2 variable takes values between -10 and +10 with -10 indicating the most autocratic 
regime and +10 indicating the most democratic regime. Model 7 supports key finding of Model 
6 that discretionary of sufficient governmental resources and increased per capita income are 
conditions under which states are able to turn into donors. 
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Table 2: Robustness Checks 
    
VARIABLES Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
    
Winning coalition 0.0207   
 (0.256)   
Goverment resources 0.820*** 0.556*** 0.845*** 
 (0.0489) (0.0368) (0.0601) 
Individual income 1.575*** 1.434*** 1.428*** 
 (0.0834) (0.0596) (0.0836) 
Trade -0.379  0.211 
 (0.111)  (0.149) 
Polity 2  0.0172** 0.0487*** 
  (0.00786) (0.0112) 
Constant -35.62*** -28.47*** -36.25*** 
 (1.546) (1.001) (1.799) 
    
Observations 4,174 6,525 3,558 
 
My main results regarding the effects of individual income and resource levels change 
little and thus are robust. In Models 7 and 8, the Governmental resources and Individual income 
variables are still positive and statistically significant. 
Models 8 and 9 show that the effect of the winning coalition is not robust. Previously, I 
demonstrated that states with small winning coalitions (i.e. autocratic regimes) are more likely 
to be aid donors. However, Models 8 and 9 demonstrate that the polity2 variable is positive and 
statistically significant regardless trade within the specification or not. This suggests that as a 
state becomes more democratic, it is more likely that the state becomes a donor. These 
robustness checks demonstrate that there is much to be done to understand how domestic 
institutions affect states’ decisions to become aid donors. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to identify when states choose to become a donor. Drawing 
on two prominent theories of foreign aid giving, “aid-for-charity” and “aid-for-policy deals” 
models (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007; 2009; Lumsdaine 1993; Noël and Thérien 1995), 
I proposed three key determinants of states’ donorship. To investigate whether these factors 
affect states’ decisions to become aid donors, I collected data on when states created aid 
agencies and tested my hypotheses empirically. My statistical analyses suggest that wealthier 
states in terms of overall GDP and GDP per capita are more likely to become donors of foreign 
aid. These provide support for both existing theories of foreign aid. However, my findings also 
suggest that the relationship between the winning coalition size and states’ donorship is not 
very clear. On one hand, I found some evidence that autocratic regimes (i.e. small winning 
coalitions) are more likely to engage in aid initiation. This finding is counterintuitive, 
challenging dominant narratives about donor states as western democracies. However, these 
results turned out to be not very robust. One interpretation of these findings is that domestic 
institutions do not matter for states’ choice to become a donor. Nonetheless, I believe that these 
findings call for more research on how domestic institutional structures affect states’ decisions 
to become aid donors. 
My thesis has several policy implications. First, my results predict that we will see more 
foreign aid donors in the near future. Given that many countries are becoming wealthier in terms 
of their GDPs and individual incomes, they are likely to become aid donors in the future. 
Second, and more importantly, my findings are useful in predicting which states are next foreign 
aid donors. For example, consider cases like Argentina, Malaysia, Peru, and South Africa. 
These countries currently do not have established aid agencies yet, but according to my 
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findings, they are likely to become aid donors in the near future, if their governmental resources 
keep rising. Also, consider Kazakhstan. Given its rapid economic growth, it is not surprising 
that Kazakhstan has started planning to have an aid agency. The new agency will systemize 
previous aid efforts and lead to the transparent aid giving practices. It says about Kazakhstan’s 
willing to apply their experience and knowledge to the development of neighboring region. 
However, my results also suggest that the most recent recession may slow down the process of 
establishing aid agencies. Finally, the establishment of new aid institutions indicates that aid 
giving will no longer be ad hoc, alternatively international assistance becoming substantial parts 
of new donors’ foreign policy. Therefore, the entry of new donors is likely to create or intensify 
competition among traditional and emerging donors. The object of competition is the 
effectiveness of aid, where each side would claim that their aid brings real development. Thus, 
I would conclude that coordination and consensus between DAC activities and practices of 
emerging donors is a crucial area for policy makers.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A 
List of Countries with Aid Agencies in the Sample 
Country Agency name Start 
year  
End 
year 
URL Notes  
Kuwait Kuwait Fund for Arab 
economic 
Development  
1961  Neumayer (2004, 282);  
Aramco World 30(6) 
http://archive.aramcoworld.com/is
sue/197906/arab.aid-
who.gives.it.htm  
Provide grants, soft loans on 
easy terms, guarantees, technical 
assistance 
Saudi Arabia Saudi Fund for 
Development 
1974  Neumayer (2004, 283); 
Aramco World 30(6) 
http://archive.aramcoworld.com/is
sue/197906/arab.aid-
who.gives.it.htm 
It is an autonomous organization 
that administrated by a board of 
directors. The board chaired by 
the Minister of Finance and 
National Economy 
United Arab 
Emirates 
(UAE) 
Abu Dhabi Fund for 
Development 
(originally Abu Dhabi 
Fund for Arab 
Economic 
Development 
1971  Neumayer (2004, 282); 
Aramco World 30(6) 
http://archive.aramcoworld.com/is
sue/197906/arab.aid-
who.gives.it.htm 
 
Iraq  The Iraqi Fund for 
External development 
1974 1982 Van den Boogaerde (1991)  
 
 
Libya  -   Van den Boogaerde (1991, 5) Give foreign aid (project loans) 
via Libyan Arab Foreign 
Investment Company. Although, 
does not have a national aid 
agency. 
Qatar  Qatar Development 
Fund  
2009   Shushan and Marcoux (2010); 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
State of Qatar 
http://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/TheM
inistry/Departments/Pages/Depart
mentOfInternationalDevelopment.
aspx 
 
The agency is chaired by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Australia  Australian 
Development 
Assistance Agency 
(1974), Australian 
Development 
Assistance Bureau 
(1976), Australian 
International 
Development 
Assistance  Bureau 
(1987), Australian 
Aid (1995)  
1974  Australian Government, Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
http://dfat.gov.au/aid/Pages/austra
lias-aid-program.aspx 
 
It was independent agency until 
2013, and then it was integrated 
into the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade. 
35 
 
 
 
Austria  The Austrian 
Development Agency 
(ADA) 
2004  Austrian Development Cooperation 
http://www.entwicklung.at/en/aust
rian-development-cooperation/  
The agency is an operational unit 
of Austrian Development 
Cooperation, which is under 
authority of Federal Ministry for 
Europe, Integration and Foreign 
Affairs. 
Azerbaijan  Azerbaijan 
International 
Development Agency 
(AIDA) 
2011  http://www.mfa.gov.az  The agency was established 
under the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
Belgium  Belgian Development 
Agency (BDA) 
1998  Belgian Development Agency 
https://www.btcctb.org/en/legal-
framework-management-and-control-
bodies  
 
Brazil  Brazilian Cooperation 
Agency (ABC) 
1987  http://www.abc.gov.br/training/inf
ormacoes/ABC_en.aspx  
Affiliated to the Ministry of 
External Relations, thus it is not 
an aid agency as such. It has 
limited autonomy (Cabral and 
Weinstock 2010). 
 
Canada Canadian 
International 
Development Agency 
(CIDA), Department 
of Foreign Affairs, 
Trade and 
Development (2013) 
1968  http://www.international.gc.ca/de
velopment-
developpement/index.aspx?lang=
eng  
In 2013, it was affiliated to 
Department of Foreign Affairs. 
Chile  Chile International 
Cooperation Agency 
(AGCI) 
1990  http://www.minrel.gob.cl/minrel/s
ite/edic/base/port/development_co
operation.html  
 
China  Foreign Aid inter-
agency liaison 
mechanism within 
Ministries of 
Commerce, Foreign 
Affairs and Finance. 
In 2011, it was 
upgraded into inter-
agency coordination 
mechanism. 
2008  http://news.xinhuanet.com/english
2010/china/2011-
04/21/c_13839683_14.htm  
There is no independent agency 
or department. It captures inter-
agency coordination mechanism 
involving Ministry of 
Commerce, The Export-Import 
Bank, Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs and Finance.  
Czech 
Republic 
Czech Development 
Agency (CzDA) 
2008  http://www.czda.cz/czda/about-
us.htm?lang=en  
Reports to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. CzDA 
identifies, formulates, 
implements, and monitors 
projects in developing countries. 
Denmark  Danish International 
Development Agency 
(DANIDA) 
1962  http://um.dk/en/danida-en/   
Egypt  Egyptian Agency of 
Partnership for 
Cooperation (EAPC) 
2014  http://www.mfa.gov.eg/English/E
DA/about/Pages/default.aspx  
http://eapd.gov.eg/en-
us/AboutUs.aspx  
It was founded in the result of 
merging “The Egyptian Fund for 
Technical Cooperation with 
Africa” and “The Egyptian Fund 
for Technical Cooperation with 
the countries of Commonwealth 
and Islamic countries and Newly 
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Independent States”. It is an 
independent institution formed 
to grant technical cooperation 
and humanitarian support.  
Finland  The Finnish 
Department for 
International 
Development 
Cooperation 
(FINNIDA) 
  http://formin.finland.fi/public/defa
ult.aspx?nodeid=49273&contentla
n=2&culture=en-US  
 
France  French Development 
Agency (AFD) 
1998  http://www.afd.fr/lang/en/home/A
FD/presentation-afd  
 
Germany  Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für 
Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit 
(GIZ) GmbH 
(German Corporation 
for International 
Cooperation) for 
technical cooperation 
and German 
Development Bank 
(KfW) for financial 
cooperation 
1961  https://www.devex.com/news/ger
man-development-aid-what-you-
need-to-know-74981   
GIZ was reorganized in 2011 by 
merging several development 
organizations: German 
Technical Cooperation (GTZ), 
(DED), German Development 
Service. All of them function 
under Federal Ministry of 
Economic Cooperation and 
Development. 
Greece Hellenic Aid (the 
Directorate General 
International 
Development 
Cooperation 
Department) 
2002  http://www.mfa.gr/en/the-
ministry/structure/hellenic-
aid.html  
 
Ireland  Irish Aid  1974  https://www.irishaid.ie/  It is a division of Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade.  
Israel  Mashav (Agency for 
International 
Development 
Cooperation) 
1958   http://www.mashav.mfa.gov.il/M
FA/mashav/AboutMASHAV/Pag
es/default.aspx  
 
Italy  Directorate General 
for Development 
Cooperation of the 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Italian 
Cooperation Agency 
(ICA, 2014) 
1987  http://www.esteri.it/mae/en/politic
a_estera/cooperaz_sviluppo/  
Clarke and Welham (2014) 
Now reorganized agency has 
organizational, regulatory, 
administrative, budgetary and 
accounting autonomy.  
Japan  Japan International 
Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) 
1974  http://www.jica.go.jp/english/  Administratively independent it 
became in 2003, thus it is 
independent governmental 
agency.  
South Korea Korea International 
Cooperation Agency 
(KOICA) 
1991  http://www.koica.go.kr/english/m
ain.html  
 
Luxembourg  Lux-Development 
S.A. 
1992  http://luxdev.lu/en/home  Originally, it was an agency 
aimed at supporting small and 
medium enterprises. Only in 
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1992 it launched international 
development programs.  
Mexico  Mexican Agency for 
International 
Development 
Cooperation 
(AMEXID) 
2011  http://amexcid.gob.mx/index.php/
en/  
It is a decentralized body of 
Mexican Secretariat of Foreign 
Affairs.  
New Zealand  NZAID 2002  https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/aid-
and-development/  
Semi-autonomous body was 
integrated into Ministry as the 
International Development 
Group in 2009.  
Netherlands  Ministry of 
Development 
Cooperation 
  https://www.government.nl/topics
/development-
cooperation/contents/the-
development-policy-of-the-
netherlands  
 
Norway  Norwegian Agency 
for Development 
Cooperation 
(NORAD) 
1968  https://www.norad.no/  Starting from 2004, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs is responsible to 
implement bilateral aid transfers.  
Poland  Polish Aid 2012  http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/foreign
_policy/polish_aid/  
 
Portugal  The Portuguese 
Institute for 
Development Support 
(IPAD) 
2003   OECD (2006, 22) Supervised by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.  
Republic of 
China 
(Taiwan)  
The International 
Cooperation and 
Development Fund 
(ICDF) 
1989  https://www.icdf.org.tw/mp.asp?
mp=2  
Government established the 
International Economic 
Cooperation and Development 
Fund (IECDF) in 1989, but then 
it became an independent 
organization in 1996.  
Romania  Development 
Assistance Unit at the 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (UAsD) 
2009  http://www.mae.ro/en/node/2062   
Russian 
Federation 
Rossotrudnichestvo 
(Federal Agency for 
the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, 
Compatriots Living 
Abroad and 
International 
Humanitarian 
Cooperation) 
2008  http://rs-gov.ru/   
Slovakia  SlovakAid 2003  http://www.slovakaid.sk/   
Spain The Spanish Agency 
for International 
Cooperation 
(AECID) 
1988  http://www.aecid.es/EN/aecid   
Sweden  Swedish International 
Development 
Cooperation Agency 
(SIDA) 
1995  http://www.sida.se/English/   
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Switzerland The Swiss Agency for 
Development and 
Cooperation (SDC) 
1976  https://www.eda.admin.ch/deza/e
n/home.html  
Office-level agency. Federal 
Department of Foreign Affairs.  
Turkey Turkish Cooperation 
and Coordination 
Agency (TIKA) 
1992  http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/page/his
tory_of_tika-8526  
Starting from 1999, TIKA 
functions under the Prime 
Ministry.  
United 
Kingdom 
Department for 
International 
Development (DfID) 
1970  https://www.gov.uk/government/o
rganisations/department-for-
international-development  
This department was separated 
from the Foreign And 
Commonwealth Office in 1997.  
United States  USAID  1961  https://usaid.gov/   
Colombia  Presidential Co-
operation Agency 
2011  OECD (2013) “the agency in charge of setting 
priorities and ensuring the 
alignment of international aid 
with the National Development 
Plan and Colombia’s foreign 
policy, as well as achieving 
greater efficacy and impact for 
the aid received and offered by 
Colombia” (OECD 2013, 211). 
Cyprus  CyprusAid 2005  http://www.cyprusaid.gov.cy/  
Estonia Division for 
Development 
Cooperation and 
Humanitarian Aid  
2001  http://www.vm.ee/en/overview-
estonian-development-
cooperation  
Within External Economic and 
Development Cooperation 
Department of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.  
India Development 
Partnership 
Administration 
(DPA) 
2012  http://www.mea.gov.in/developm
ent-partnership-
administration.htm  
 
Iceland  The Icelandic 
International 
Development Agency 
(ICEIDA) 
1981  http://www.iceida.is/english/about
-iceida/  
 
Latvia Development 
Cooperation Policy 
Division 
2005  http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/
development-co-operation/latvia-
s-contribution-to-development-
assistance  
Within Economic Relations and 
Development Cooperation of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
Lithuania Three divisions: 
Development 
Cooperation Policy 
and Planning; 
Multilateral 
Cooperation; and 
Bilateral Cooperation. 
2007  http://www.dsw.org/euroresources
/donor-profiles/lt-
lithuania.html?L=0  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Malta Development 
Division 
2007  http://www.dsw.org/euroresources
/donor-profiles/mt-malta.html  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Thailand Thailand 
International 
Cooperation Agency 
(TICA) 
2004  www.tica.thaigov.net/   
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Appendix B 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
      
VARIABLES N mean SD min max 
      
Donorship 10,484 0.114 0.318 0 1 
polity2 7,739 0.965 7.452 -10 10 
Winning coalition 10,634 0.558 0.275 0 1 
Govermental 
resources 
8,010 23.31 2.401 16.59 30.33 
 
Individual income 
 
8,006 
 
7.907 
 
1.606 
 
4.242 
 
11.97 
 
Trade 
 
4,264 
 
3.472 
 
0.700 
 
-5.226 
 
5.439 
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